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OUTLAWS OF THE PAST: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse
Possession
Years ago when the Cowboy roamed the West, land barons purchased large tracts of land consisting of hundreds of thousands of acres.
In part, to prevent stagnation of the land and under-use of natural resources, American courts imported two English doctrines-prescription and adverse possession.' The courts believed these two legal devices would
provide an incentive to landowners to work all portions of their holdings.2
Although these tools remain in effect today, the public policy supporting their usage has long since gone the way of the cattle drive and the
chuckwagon. 3 This comment endorses the legislative abolition of prescription and adverse possession primarily because current public policy prefers land and resource preservation versus exploitation.4 In the past half1. John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 816, 816 (1994) ("[The American model of adverse possession is] dominated by a pro development nineteenth century ideology that encourages and legitimates economic exploitation - and thus
environmental degradation - of wild lands") [hereinafter Sprankling].
2. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1995) (policy justification for adverse possession doctrine in the past was that
a penalty should inure to a landowner for using land inefficiently) [hereinafter Miceli & Sirmans];
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) (adverse
possession viewed as a reward for use of land or useful labor on a property); Meyer v. Law, 287 So.
2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973) (adverse possession stems from a time when an ever-increasing use of land was
encouraged); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 1 (1986) (citing Meyer). See also Jeffry M.
Netter, Philip L. Hersch, and William D. Manson, An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession
Statutes, 6 INT'L REV. L. AND ECON. 217, 219 (1986) [hereinafter Netter] (adverse possession
rewards the use of land and punishes those who sit on their rights).
3. Sprankling, supra note 1, at 817 (adverse possession is a dusty obscure relic). Early American definitions of property focused on the use of land in defining the rights held by a landowner and
illustrate one prevailing attitude toward property: "Property is the right to use and consume a thing
(Dominium estjus utendi er abutendi re)"; "the right of property carries with it the right to make a
bad use of things." Bernard Schwartz, The Law In America, 164 (1974) [hereinafter Schwartz].
4. Sprankling, supra note 1, at 816-18. "The concept of adverse possession is an ancient and,
perhaps, somewhat outdated one. It stems from a time when an ever-increasing use of land was to be,
and was, encouraged. Today, however, faced as we are, with problems of unchecked over-development, depletion of precious natural resources, and pollution of our environment, the policy reasons
that once supported the idea of adverse possession may well be succumbing to new priorities."
Meyer, 287 So. 2d at 41. The importance of the web of public obligations, otherwise known as the
public trust, which accompanies land ownership in America must be recognized. However, the scope
and breadth of the public trust is subject to changes with the goals of society. Each landowner should
not be treated as a sovereign state, immune from regulations and obligations to the country and the
community. "[Tihe property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
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century, many groups have been founded to preserve land and natural
resources through land trusts and other devices. 5
Not only are prescriptive easements6 and adverse possession relics of
the past, they represent a significant imposition on landowner rights. One
commentator compared the working of adverse possession to rewarding
the theft of land.7 Landowners now comprise a much higher percentage of
society than anytime in the last century in America.' Private property
ownership represents one of the few bastions of privacy left to American
citizens, and thus, landowner rights have become much more important in
recent years. 9

This comment first follows the historic trail of the development of
prescription and adverse possession in England and how they later became
accepted infringements"0 on landowner rights in America." While journeying past the major landmarks along this trail, this comment examines
the underlying political and public policy forces. The second part of this
comment will define prescription and adverse possession. It will also

5. "Land trusts" are usually non-profit organizations organized to promote use of conservation easements and to fund the purchase of lands for preservation. "There are currently over 1100
land trusts throughout the United States with the average of one new organization being founded each
week." Telephone interview with Susan Doran, Information Center Manager for the Land Trust Alliance in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 25, 1995). The Land Trust Alliance began in 1984 and currently has
600 land trust members. Id. Other similar organizations currently in existence include the Jackson
Hole Land Trust based in Jackson, Wyoming (founded in 1980), the Nature Conservancy (founded in
1949), the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation and the American Farmland Trust. Telephone interview
with Dave Neary, Associate State Director of the Nature Conservancy, in Lander, Wyoming (Sept.
25, 1995). Groups concerned with the preservation of landowner rights include Floridians for Property Rights and the League of Private Property Owners (Battleground, Washington). The New Politics,
September 30, 1995, available on World Wide Web, Sierra Club Home Page.
6. A thorough review of cases, treatises, and law review articles revealed that prescription
today exists almost exclusively in the form of the prescriptive easement. Most textbooks and courts, it
appears, use the terms "prescription" and "prescriptive easements" interchangeably as the authors of
this paper intend to do from this point forward.
7. Netter, supra note 2, at 219.
8. The increased percentage of land owners in American society is illustrated by a 20% increase in home ownership by resident occupants since 1890. In 1890 47% of all occupied housing
units were owned by the residents. In 1990 64.2% of all occupied housing units were owned by the
residents. The large increase in owner-occupied units came after World War II. 1990 Housing Highlights, Census of Population and Housing, U.S. Dept. Comm. Bureau of the Census, CH-S-1-1 (July
1991).
9. Although the "property rights movement" existed for several decades in one form or another, it gained momentum during the Reagan Administration and the movement has introduced legislation to bolster landowner rights throughout the United States. David J. Russ, How the Property
Rights Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (1994).
10. See infra notes 143 and 144 and accompanying text.
11. A prescriptive easement has been characterized as "an easement that subtracts from the
preexisting rights of the servient owner." 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
34.10, at 34-111 (1994) [hereinafter POWELL].
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briefly discuss several types of easements and licenses that bear a close
resemblance to these adversarial doctrines.
The third section of this comment will discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of continued use of prescription and adverse possession.
The final part of the paper will endorse the "laying to rest" of prescription and adverse possession and advance a legislative program for such a
retraction. 12
BACKGROUND: ORIGIN OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE AND ADVERSE DOCTRINES

England

Prescription is a common-law theory that was initially based on local
customs in England. t" Its genesis is hard to pinpoint because of the presence of "uses," "tenures" and other concepts that serve to muddy historical waters; 4 however, it is doubtful it existed to any great degree before
the Norman Conquest or during the reign of feudalism in the British
Isles.'" For the same reasons, germination of adverse possession most
likely took place in a post feudalism period.' 6
People held real property during these early times under tenure 7 or
loan,' 8 meaning the Crown ultimately held the land.' 9 With all the land

12. It is the role of the legislative branch, not that of the courts, to change public policy. Lowe
v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 212-13, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 2574 (1985) (concurring opinion) ("The task of defining the objectives of public policy and weighing the relative merits of
alternative means of reaching those objectives belongs to the legislature. The courts should not lightly
take it upon themselves to state that the path chosen by Congress is an impermissible one."); See also
Mitchell v Smith, 4 U.S. 269, 270 (Pa. 1803) ("When the legislature pass[es] a law upon a particular
subject, it is the duty of the Court to see it carried into execution in the manner described in the law,
and in no other."); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 66 (1944).
13. See infra notes 21, 22, 23 and accompanying text.
14. 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §

337, at 158 (repl. ed. 1980) [hereinafter THOMPSON].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The basic doctrine of tenure stated that all land whatsoever was held, whether directly or
indirectly by the Crown. Few signs of the doctrine of tenure exist today in England. A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 1 (2nd ed. 1986) [hereinafter SIMPSON].
18. Loan was one prominent form of land 'ownership" prior to the Norman Conquest in England. A loan created a relationship between lender and holder which closely resembled the feudal
relationship between lord and tenant of post Conquest times. Id. at 2.
19. Records are clear that after the Conquest in 1066 King William's staff applied the idea of
tenure universally. Id. at 3. Tenure provided the king with a means to reward his followers and maintain his military strength by granting land to his loyalists in return for knight-service and other types
of tenures. Knight-service required the grantee to provide the king with "X" number of knights for a
period of time, usually several months, each year. Id.
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commonly controlled by the Crown, there was little need for doctrines of
a prescriptive or adverse nature. 20
The growth of centralized royal jurisdiction in the post Conquest era
created a uniform land law at the expense of local customs and baronial
courts.21 A few customs survived this wave of forced uniformity, including the prescriptive doctrine.'
Although its history is hazy, local custom appears to have recognized prescription as a private right in variance with the "national" common law.' These earliest cases of prescription did not require the user to
show continued use but instead the presence of a local custom that supported such use. The difference between local custom and prescription in
these cases was negligible.24
Then, a successful claim of prescription had to show use of the property' since "time immemorial" or since the year 1189.26 Some courts recognized the inequity of requiring a party to prove use since "time immemorial"
and developed a rule known as the lost grant theory.27 The theory involved

the construction of a legal fiction that supposed the user had received a grant
from the land owner but had subsequently lost it. 28 Codification of prescription caused the "lost grant" to disappear into the river of time.29

20. Adverse possession and prescription were unavailable against the Crown. JOHN W. BRUCE &
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 5.02(4) (1988) (citing Armstrong

v. Morrill, 81 U.S. 120, 145 (1871)) [hereinafter BRUCE & ELY] (time does not run against the King).
21.

SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 20. As the value of services declined due to the parliament's

ability to pay for a military force, the usefulness of tenure, and thereby feudalism, began to erode.
This decline began in 1290 but tenure was not abolished, for the most part, until the passage of the
Statute of Tenures in 1660. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 110. Most of these surviving customs remained because they figured highly in the
operation of communal agriculture. Id. at 108.
23. Id. at 109-10. The history of prescription and adverse possession is somewhat confusing
and scholars differ as to the origins of the doctrines. See THOMPSON, supra note 14, § 337, at 158
("The origin of prescription is clouded by historical fog.").
24. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 108. See Abbot v. Weekly, I Lev. 176 (K.B. 1665).
25. Most claims of prescription took the form of profits. Profits allowed the holder of the right
to take away something of value-turf, wood, grass, fish-from the burdened land. A typical easement of the times (e.g. a right of way) did not have this characteristic nor does it today. Medieval law
had little experience dealing with easements. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 107.
26. This date was selected as the time "wherefore the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" which was the year Richard I ascended the throne. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 6 (1941) (quoting
Johnson v. Lewis, 2 S.W. 329, 330 (Ark. 1886). See Stott v. Stott, 104 Eng.Rep. 1119 (K.B. 1812)
(use required since time immemorial).
27. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 109-10. See also Lewis v. Price, 2 Wins. Saunders 175 (1761)
(earliest reported case using the lost grant theory). The term "prescription" comes from the term
.prascriptio" meaning prescribing or former writing and presupposes a lost grant. Sparks v. Byrd,
562 So. 2d 211, 214 (Ala. 1990).
28. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 110.
29. Id. Although England abolished the lost grant fiction, America adopted its use (Sparks v.
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The initial root of adverse possession is easier to identify than the
origin of prescription. Original policy supporting the development of adverse possession reflected society's unwillingness to take away a "right"
which an adverse possessor thought he had. Similarly, society felt the loss
of an unknown right by the title owner was minimal.3' The Act of 1623
restricted the right of entry to a period of twenty years.31 Thus, the parturition of adverse possession originated in statute.32
America
"Much of the misunderstanding and confusion that surrounds the
courts' treatment of prescription comes from the historical fog out of which
the doctrine emerged." 33 A review of authorities on the subject does not
provide an exact reason why prescription and adverse possession became part
of American law; although there is little doubt it was a result of the pro
development effect of the doctrines and common law tradition.'
In Wyoming, the supreme court provided a glimpse at prescription
as applied on North American terra firma.35 In a dispute over the use of a
waterway and an irrigation ditch flume, landowner Gustin averred he had
a right by prescriptive easement to use his neighbor's canal and waterdiverting mechanism. The court defined "prescription" as use that was
"actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than 10

Byrd, supra note 27, at 214 (noting most states adopted the lost grant theory in early history)), but
now, most states have discarded the theory (Dillingham Commercial Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705
P.2d 410, 416 (Alaska 1985) (citing W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 3 at 77 (1965)).
30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.10, at 70 (3rd ed. 1986)
(citing Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hary. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897)) [hereinafter
Posner].
31. Id. at 150. This statute also prevented the enforcement of stale claims. Id.
32. Under early law, 'adverse possession' had a complex meaning that bound an adverse possessor to acquire seisin. Id. at 150 n.28. The first adverse possession statute in America took the form
of a statute of limitations in North Carolina in 1715. Netter, supra note 2, at 218, n.4 (citing Patton's
Lessee v. Easton, 14 U.S. 474 (1816)).
33. THOMPSON, supra note 14, § 337, at 158.
34. Id. See supra note 1. It has been said the doctrine of adverse possession to real property is
.very securely embedded in the consciousness of the people," which may provide some insight as to
its adoption in America. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Adverse Possession § 1 (1986); see generally 28 C.J.S. Easements § 6 (1941); 3 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 796, at 299-300 (3rd ed.
1939) [hereinafter TIFFANY]; 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1191, at 95965 (3rd ed. 1975) [hereinafter H. TIFFANY]. "When the English colonists sailed to America, they
took the common law with them. Though individual systems and bodies of law evolved in each colony, their bedrock was the common law." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 20.
35. Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 P. 522, 524 (1912). Gustin provides a look at one approach to prescription, however, many states grappled with the issue in the early years of America.
Gustin appears to be a case of first impression of adverse possession brought before the Wyoming
Supreme Court.
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years." 36 This definition is similar to that used in most states37 and has
experienced little change throughout the years.38
Another Wyoming case, Bryant v. Cadle,39 1909, gave a view of the
courts' interpretation of adverse possession as a new settler to the 44th
State would have experienced it.'
Adverse possession as applied to real estate is described as an actual,
visible, and exclusive appropriation of land, commenced and continued under a claim of right, with the intent to assert such claim
against the true owner, and accompanied by such an invasion of the
rights of the opposite party as to give him a cause of action. The
possession must be hostile, and under a claim of right, it must be
actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous."'
Thus, adverse possession and prescription became part of the legal
fabric of America. All 50 states have embraced one form or another of
the prescription and adverse possession doctrines, and the ideas are part
of our adoptive consciousness.42 However, simply because something is

36. Id. at 528. Wyoming statute had recently changed the period for prescription to 10 years
by passing a law in 1886 which shortened the period considerably from the prior requirement of 21
years. Id. at 527-28.
37. The definition of prescription in Gustin included the requirement of "exclusive" use. Id.
While several states interchange the terms "adverse" and "prescription," most states currently do not
require "exclusive" use to achieve an easement through prescription. See Appendix 1. However, the
"exclusive" requirement is still needed for adverse possession and is one of the differentiating factors
between adverse possession and prescription. Id. See also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 37. The primary change in the requirements needed to find the presence of
a prescriptive right has been the shortening of the prescriptive period and elimination of the reliance
on the supposed "lost grant." In the early American cases a 60 year prescriptive period was not uncommon. See Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49 (Mass. 1817) (prescriptive period required 60 years
adverse use); "Prescription, in the ancient sense of the word, is founded upon the supposition of a
that the use or possession, on which it is founded, must be adverse, or of a
grant; and therefore it is,
nature to indicate that it is claimed as a right, and not the effect of indulgence, or of any compact,
short of a grant." Id. at 52. See also supra note 36.
39. 18 Wyo. 64, 104 P. 23 (1909); modified 18 Wyo. 95 (Wyo. 1910).
40. A homesteader that had abandoned his wife and property later protested the sale of the property
to a bona fide purchaser. Bryant, 18 Wyo. at 77. The court found the wife and subsequent buyer had satisfied the adverse period to perfect title through tacking. Id. at 95. Adverse possession, as it was previously
used in the United States, was ill formed and simply required "twenty years interrupted and exclusive possession of the land." Plummer v. Lane, 1 Am.Dec. 395 (Md. G.C. 1797). However, by the mid-nineteenth
century, the definition of adverse possession had solidified through the accrual of various court cases and
applicable statutes. See Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256, 275, 59 Am.Dec. 115 (1853); Adverse
possession is "actual, adverse, and continuous possession for twenty years." Id. (citing Cheney v. Ringgold,
2 H.&J. 87 (1807)); Hammond v. Ridgely, 5 H.&J. 245, 5 lb. 264 (1821).
41. Bryant, 18 Wyo. at 86 (citing Ency.Law, at 789 (2nd ed. (date omitted)).
42. See Appendix 1 (Prescriptive Laws of the Fifty States), and Appendix 2 (Adverse Possession Statutes of the Fifty States).
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legal does not mean lawmakers should ignore the possibility a concept can
become outdated and warrant change. 3
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Several legal theories resembling prescription and adverse possession
exist as part of current land law and add to the confusion of the adversely-related doctrines. For example, the right conveyed by license is very
similar to the right realized through a prescriptive easement, although the
former usually lacks the adverse nature of the latter. 4
The continual recognition of new types of easements also contributes
to the confusion in this area of the law. The courts acknowledge that
although easements must be analogous to the established types, if a
claimed right benefits the dominant land as land, new breeds of easements
will be recognized to fit the changed conditions of society.45
Specifically, two derivatives of these legal doctrines should be mentioned: irrevocable licenses, and easements by estoppel. Licenses are
usually revocable at the will of the servient landowner, and its duration is
subject to the discretion of said landowner.' If, however, the user invests
his resources to facilitate use of the license, it may become irrevocable.47
An action of estoppel can create an easement that closely resembles
the right received through irrevocable license. "Generally the owner of
the servient estate is estopped from denying an easement exists if he sits
by while the dominant estate owner expends funds to improve the servient
43. Although legal for close to a century in America, slavery is an example of an unjust property law that deserved the abolition it eventually received. DONALD T. PHILLIPS, LINCOLN ON LEADERSHIP, 91 (1992).
44. An easement is a right of use over the property of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
509 (6th ed. 1990). Easements may exist "in gross" or "appurtenant tothe land." Ordinarily, an
easement exists "for the benefit of the owner of some particular land, it belonging to him as an incident of his ownership of the land. TIFFANY, supra note 34, Vol. 3 § 756, at 203-04. Thus, there is
not only a "servient" tenement, land subject to the easement, but also a "dominant" tenement, land in
favor of which the easement exists. This type of easement is "appurtenant" to the dominant tenement,
"and it must be such that it conduces to the beneficial use of such tenement." Id. An easement "in
gross" is recognized separately from a particular dominant tenement and is classified as a personal
privilege. Id.
45. See infra note 122. See also O'Neill v. Brown, 609 N.E.2d 835 (111.App. Ct. 1993)
(solar sky space easement).
46. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 2 (1941).
47. For example, the building of a bridge across a creek to use a right of way is granted
through license. Most courts would consider this an irrevocable license, (see Holbrook v. Taylor, 532
S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976)); or an easement by estoppel, (see ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B.
STOEBUCK & DALE A WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.8 (1984)); versus an easement by
prescription.
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estate."" This requires a change in position by the dominant estate holder
so that denial of the easement would be a fraudulent act by the servient
estate holder.49

Prescription:Today's Definition
Prescription is described by some as "the effect of lapse of time in
creating or extinguishing property interests. " ' It is based on the theory
that if "one makes non-permissive use of another's land, and the landowner fails to prevent such use, such acquiescence is conclusive evidence
that the user is rightful."' A prescriptive easement52 is created "by such
use of land, for the period of prescription, as would be privileged if an
easement existed, provided its use is (1) adverse, and (2) for the period of
prescription, continuous and uninterrupted." 53
A use of land is considered "adverse" to the property owner "when
it is (a) not made in subordination to him, and (b) wrongful, or may be
made by him wrongful, as to him, and (c) open and notorious."' Quite
often, the fact that the user bases his use under an affirmative claim of
right shows the absence of submission to the landowner. 55 To be adverse
a use must be "wrongful as to the owner of the interest affected or must
be capable of being made by him wrongful as to him." 56 A use is "open

48. THOMPSON, supra note 14, § 315.

49. Vance T. Countryman and Drew A. Perkins, Comment, Death of the Dark Ages? The
Troubled Law of Easements in Wyoming, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 151, 163 (1992) [hereinafter
Countryman & Perkins].
50. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 38, Topic A (Introductory Note).

51. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 796, at 300.
52. Rights other than easements may be secured by an adverse user through prescription,
however, these instances are infrequent. Id. For clarification, some of the types of rights that may be
gained through prescription will be listed. A right of way over another's land, the right to appropriate water against riparian proprietors, or against prior appropriators. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 1194,
to dam or obstruct the water of a stream so as to flood the land
at 973 (citations omitted). The right
of another, the right to have water run its natural course, the right to pollute water, or to control or
change its flow. Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, the right of support for a building by another building or adjacent lot cannot be gained through prescriptive means. Id. (citations omitted). The use of a
party wall may be prescriptively achieved, but these cases involve the placement of beams or other
parts of a building in or on a wall upon another's land. Id. (citations omitted). See Id. at 973-81 for
citations corresponding with the above case situations.
53. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 457 (1944). 'IWihether the [prescriptive] easement is appurtenant or in gross is to be determined by the consideration whether the user of the servient tenement throughout the prescriptive period was for the benefit of, and in connection with, one particular
piece of land, and also of the consideration of its utility in connection with such land or its lack of
utility apart therefrom. TIFFANY, supra note 34, § 759, at 209.
54. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 458 (1944).
55. Id. at cmt. d.
56. Id. at cmt. e.
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and notorious" if the owner has actual or inquiry notice of the use. Even
if the adverse user consciously tries to conceal such use or prevent knowledge of 7such use from reaching the owners, the use is "open" and "notorious. ,1
The period of prescription is the period fixed by state statute."8 Once
satisfied, an adverse user may obtain an easement by prescription.59
An adverse use is continuous when "it is made without a break in
the essential attitude of mind required for adverse use."'" Continuous use
does not require constant use. Use may be continuous through a series of
acts or through periods of time (e.g., seasonal use). 6 An adverse use is
uninterrupted when "those against whom the use is adverse do not (a)
bring and pursue to judgment legal proceedings in which the use is determined to be without legal justification, or, (b) cause a cessation of the use
without the aid of legal proceedings."'62
Actual use during the prescriptive period determines the extent of
the easement.63 "[B]enefit of an easement created by prescription may
accrue to the [prescriptive] user alone, or to the [prescriptive] user and
others. "64
Adverse Possession: Today's Definition
Restatement of Property notes that although "prescription" as defined above, once referred to acquisition of both corporeal and incorporeal interests, common law usage has changed the definition. Now, when

57. Id. at cmt. h.
58. Prescriptive period is generally seven years. Jackson v. Stone, 210 Ga. App. 465, 436
S.E.2d 673 (1993) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-9-1, 44-9-54); Statutory period of prescription is

five years. Brown v. Tintinger, 245 Mont. 373, 801 P.2d 607 (1990) (citing MONT. CODE. ANN. §
70-19-401); To establish title by prescription, there must be adverse possession for a period of fifteen
years. Brown v. Mayfield, 786 P.2d 708 (Okla. 1989) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 93 and tit. 60, §
333); Prescriptive period is twenty years when action is brought against "wild land." Henderson v.

Cam Dev. Co., 190 Ga. App. 199, 378 S.E.2d 495 (1989) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-9-1, 44-959); Period of prescription is seven years. Neyland v. Hunter, 282 Ark. 323, 668 S.W.2d 530 (1984)

(citing ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 76-104, 76-105); To establish a prescriptive easement, adverse use must
continue for at least ten years. Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795 (Wyo. 1981) (citing Wyo. STAT. §
1-3-103 (1988)).
59. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 460. "For the purpose of making out the period of prescription, the periods of use of successive adverse users may be added if privity exists between
them." Id. at § 464.
60. Id. at § 459.
61. Id. at cmt. b.
62. Id. at § 459.
63. Id. at § 461.
64. Id. at § 462.
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referring to prescriptive acquisition of incorporeal interests, the correct
term is "prescription"; and when referring to the acquisition of corporeal
interests, the proper term is "adverse possession" or "limitations." 6'
Although very similar, several differences exist between adverse possession and prescription.
Corpus Juris Secundum defines "adverse possession" as "open and
hostile possession of land under claim of title to the exclusion of the true
owner, which, if continued for the period prescribed by statute, ripens
into actual title."' Some scholars view this adverse concept as "nothing
more than [one] taking [another's] property for his own private use."'67
Differences between a prescriptive easement and adverse possession
include:
*-Fee simple vs. Easement: Adverse possession ripens into
actual title of the property adversely held while prescription simply conveys the right to use that property
in a certain way as defined by the adverse use;
*-Exclusive possession vs. Non-exclusive: Adverse
possession requires the possession to be exclusive coupled with a claim of possession whereas prescription
simply requires non exclusive use accompanied by a
claim of use;68
The definition of the adverse doctrine and its various factors (i.e., "adverse") have been covered in the previous subsection. Adverse possession
and prescription share many common traits of note.
Similarity Between Adverse Possession and Prescription
In comparing prescription and adverse possession, it is noticeable
that both doctrines are quite similar.
While the doctrine of prescription arises from a presumption of a
grant arising from a long-continued adverse enjoyment, and differs from the doctrine of adverse possession in this respect and in
65. Id. at ch. 38, Introductory Note.
66. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 2, at 645 (1972). See also Appendix 2 for a list of adverse
possession statutes.
67. Id. at 646.
68. See generally 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 1-4, at 645-48 (1972). This is a generalization as
states have various definitions of adverse possession and prescription. See Appendix 1 and 2.
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the nature of right acquired, both are very similar in that both
doctrines are determined in a similar manner and the consequences are the same. 69
At times, the two ideas have been cross-utilized where a claim of prescriptive easement satisfied the adverse possession requirement of a property.7 ° Due to their similarities, these two ideas create similar advantages
and disadvantages in the area of property law.
BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF THE ADVERSE CONCEPTS

The Adverse Advantage
"They benefit the community because they work to increase the
use of land," a proponent of adverse possession and prescription might
say in defense of the doctrines.71 Although benefits may accrue to an
individual,' the gain usually flows in one direction-toward the dominant estate and society.73 The touted benefits of prescription and adverse possession include allowing non-owners to use another's land,74
requiring landowners to be conscious of the use and composition of
their holdings,75 allowing neighbors to maximize more fully the use of
their land, 76 allowing prompt resolution of land disputes, 77 and providing improvements to the servient estate.78

69. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 2, at 649 (1972).
70. See United States v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D.Ariz. 1990) (The Zuni Indian tribe made a
pilgrimage to a sacred mountain region each year for 65 years and the court held the tribe had a valid
prescriptive right by virtue of adverse possession by the United States on their behalf.).
71. See POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.10 ("[Prescription's] continuance has been justified
because of its functional utility . . . in stabilizing long continued property uses."); see also
Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wash.2d 853, 676 P.2d 431 (1984) (citing 7 RICHARD R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 1012 (1982) and C. Callahan, Adverse Possession, 91-94 (1961))
(doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at law for the purpose of, among other things,
assuring maximum utilization of land); Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist., 99 Cal. App. 3d
691, 696-697, 160 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (1979) ("[L]and use has historically been favored over
disuse, and therefore he who uses land is preferred in the law to he who does not, even though
the latter is the rightful owner.").
72. An easement may accrue to a person or a group "in gross" or "appurtenant to" the land.
See supra note 44.
73. The adverse possessor or prescriptive easement holder gains the use of another's land
while the servient estate owner is not compensated. See infra text accompanying notes 79 and 80.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 79 and 80.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 81, 82 and 83.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 87, 86 and 88.
77. POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.10.
78. See supra note 52.
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Allows Non-Owner to Use Another's Land
A major benefit of adverse possession and prescription accrues to
the adverse possessor or person seeking a prescriptive easement. As
adverse possession and prescription are voluntary actions taken by the
hostile user or possessor,79 the user or possessor must benefit, or he
would not endure the legal process of perfecting his interest. In an intelligible view, these actions provide a prescriptive user with a "free" property right and an adverse possessor with "free" land.'
Requires Owner to Know Composition and Use of Land
Adverse possession and prescription supposedly provide a strong
inducement to landowners to become stewards of the land. The ripening
of an adverse use or possession would lead to the loss of a few or all of
the "bundle of sticks" in a landowner's possession." Presumably, no
landowner would want his land to become burdened or to lose part of his
holdings.' s A diligent landowner, therefore, can prevent an adverse possessor or person seeking prescription from gaining part of his holdings.8
The diligence required of a landowner in managing an estate is a benefit
to a community and discourages absenteeism.
Additionally, a landowner may lose land to an adverse possessor or
prescriptive easement holder if he is not completely aware of his holdings. To defend against adverse possession and prescription, a landowner
must know the "bundle of sticks" he possesses. An owner's knowledge
of his holdings provides clarity to the title of the holdings. Clarity of title,
in return, streamlines the process associated with real property transac-

79. The "hostile" element illustrates the voluntary nature of adverse possession and prescription. Courts consider permissive use of land as a block to the ripening of an adverse or prescriptive
claim. Permissive use is considered voluntary and adverse use is considered involuntary. One of the
elements common to adverse possession and prescriptive easements is "adversity." This element is
often described as a person's intentionally challenging use of another's land without regard to the
rights of the servient owner. See Crigger v. Florida Power Corp., 436 So. 2d 937, 944 n.16 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Patch v. Baird, 140 Vt. 60, 64, 435 A.2d 690, 692 (1981).

80. See POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.10.
81. Adverse possession leads to the loss of the entire bundle of sticks in the land that is adversely possessed. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 165 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
82. The element of adversity or hostility is concerned with the presumption that it is against
the will of the landowner. If the landowner permitted the use then the claim of adverse possession or
prescription would fail. See supra notes 55, 56 and accompanying text.
83. The doctrines underlying adverse possession and prescriptive easements "reflect the philosophy ... that a diligent occupant should be rewarded at the expense of a careless owner." BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 20, 5.01, at 5-3 (1988).
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tions. 4 The fear of adverse possession or prescription encourages the
landowner to know his holdings in their entirety.
Allows Neighbors to More Fully Utilize Their Land
Convenience and efficiency are two avowed benefits that inure to the
hostile user or possessor. These doctrines allow neighbors to more fully
use their land, for instance, by taking advantage of a direct or easier route
to a particular point. Easements of necessity would provide relief in most
of these instances.' However, prescriptive easements differ from easements of necessity as determination of an easement of a prescriptive
nature is based on want.86 An easement of necessity is determined based
on need and equity." Providing an additional benefit of convenience or
efficiency forms the primary motivation for a dominant estate owner
seeking another's land or use thereof. This benefits both the dominant
landowner and society under the rationale of the common law.' s
Termination of Land Disputes
The swift resolution of land disputes is another asserted benefit of
prescription and adverse possession. 9 If hostile use has continued for the
period required by law, adverse possession or prescription may bring an
end to the dispute through a claim brought by the dominant estate owner.
A court grants the dominant estate owner the use and ends the dispute.
This may benefit society through functionality and preventing lengthy
legal battles.'

84. See infra note 191.
85. See infra note 139.
86. A person seeking prescription must do so with a claim of right or an attempt to gain
the use of property which he does not already have. See Luoma v. Donohoe, 588 P.2d 523
(Mont. 1978) (to receive a prescriptive right there must be a distinct and positive assertion by
the dominant owner of a right hostile to the owner of the servient estate); see also Roberts v.
Quisenberry, 242 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Mo. 1951) (an easement by necessity may not be adverse
while the necessity continues).
87. See infra note 139.
88. The dominant owner gains a property interest, (supra note 50) and society gains the increased utilization of land. See supra note 71.

89. One commentator holds prescriptive easements out as a way to end disputes of land quickly. See POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.10.

90. Proponents of the adverse doctrines also mention the advantage that accrues to the servient
landowner through improvements made by the adverse user or possessor. This advantage may occur
but infrequently. See supra note 52.
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Disadvantages and Problems Created by Prescriptionand Adversity
The burdens of prescription and adverse possession fall onto the
shoulders of the subservient estate. They represent the forced infringement of a landowner's rights,"' a decrease in value of the servient estate, 92
and the encouraged exploitation and development of land.93 In addition,
they represent the generation of animosity between neighbors, 94 a source
of damages to land or loss of land ownership, 95 and the creation of uncertainty for the landowner.'
Forced Infringement of Landowner's Rights
The landowner whose holdings are subject to adverse possession
or prescriptive easement always loses something. Some professionals
argue that recognition of a prescriptive easement is the recognition of
rights in addition to those held by the landowner. 97 It would be hard to
convince a servient estate holder of this point each time he looks outside his window and sees a flooded backyard.98 The right to exclude
others is an important property right.' Furthermore, adverse actions
force a landowner into a legal battle involuntarily." ° Through these
claims, the landowner loses a right once in his possession.'°'
The laws of adverse possession also diminish a landowner's
rights as the period of possession shortens. In old England and early
America, 20 to 60 years were required before allowing an adverse
possession claim to ripen."°c Recent trends show a shortening of the

91. See supra notes 52, 79 and 80 and infra notes 100, 101 and 101 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 109, 110, 111 and 112 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 114 and 115 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 116, 117, 118 and 119 and accompanying text.
96. See infra note 122.
97. Interview with Dean Arthur R. Gaudio, University of Wyoming at Laramie, Wyoming
(August 28, 1995). This view contends that the servient estates subordination to the dominant estate is
exercised through rights which were always present but not previously exercised.
98. See supra note 52.
99. The right to exclude others from one's land is held to be a significant part of a landowner's
rights. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct 2309 (1994) (The court held that the infringement of
the public on the land of an owner was significant enough to raise a takings claim.).
100. If a landowner agreed to an "adverse" use, the claims for prescription or adverse possession would lose the necessary element of adversity. The claim of right is brought by the dominant
estate owner. See supra note 79.
101. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra note 99.
102. See supra notes 31 and 38 and accompanying text. In 39 states, the statutory period of
adverse possession did not change between 1876 and 1982. Netter, supra note 2, at 224. However, of
the remaining states, most reduced the period for the ripening of an adverse possession claim: Florida
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period, which lessens the landowner's opportunity to discover the
adverse possessor.' 03

Diminished Value of the Servient Estate
With an actual burden of a prescriptive easement or adverse possession comes a decrease in the value of the servient estate."° When a landowner sells his property, the buyer often requests a guarantee of the
property to be free from unseen encumbrances." 5 Prescriptive easements
and adverse possession obviously concern potential buyers otherwise a
guarantee would not be requested." °' "The greater the uncertainty as to
the true ownership of land, the lower will be the transaction price."" If
the property is of less value due to an adverse claim, the servient estate
has lost value, which may or may not be quantifiable. 8
Encouraged Exploitation and Development of Land
This argument is the mirror image of the "benefits of increased use
of land" assertion discussed above."° Contrary to the past, society no
longer supports the over use of lands and resources." 0 Because of overfrom 20 years to 7 years, Iowa from 20 years to 17 years, Maine from 21 years to 20 years, Massachusetts from 21 years to 20 years, Nebraska from 21 years to 10 years, New York from 20 years to
10 years, and Washington from 10 to 7 years. Id. at n.32. See also supra note 36.
opportunity to
period gives a landowner less
103. Netter, supra note 2, at 220 (shorter statutory
monitor his property and discover an adverse possessor).
104. The Supreme Court notes that an easement or the right to exclude others carries a value.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra note 99, at 2321. "An easement subtracts from the preexisting rights
of the servient owner." POWELL, supra note 11,§ 34.10.
105. See generally C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration:An English Solution to an American Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 55, 59 (1988) [hereinafter Bostick].
106. Several servitudes are now recognized by the courts, to which the owner of the land had
never agreed and usually are not part of the public record. These five theories include: implication,
necessity, implied reciprocity, estoppel in rem and prescription. RICHARD H. CHUSED, A PROPERTY
ANTHOLOGY, at 240 (1993) (quoting Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55
S.CAL. L. REv. 1179 (1982)).
107. Netter, supra note 2, at 219. "It is true the buyer can decrease his risk in some ways.
First, he can require the conveyance be made by a warranty deed. In this way the buyer has a cause
of action for damages against the seller if the title is not good. This is of course not much security if
the seller disappears. Also, the buyer could purchase title insurance, but the price of that insurance
will reflect the inherent risk." Id. at n. 14.
108. "It is not an overstatement to suggest that problems relating to matters of title assurance have
affected directly the pocketbook of every American who has bought or sold land in this century. Any practitioner who has had to explain to a client the astonishingly high 'closing costs' related to title search and tile
insurance, and any client who has had to pay these costs, is painfully aware of the shortcomings of title
assurance under the existing American practice." See Bostick, supra note 105, at 56 (noting part of the
problem is due to the complexities of the substantive American law of real property).
109. See supra note 71.
110. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN (1992). See also
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population, pollution and depletion of precious resources-which includes
natural habitats-societal values have shifted from "use and abuse" to
"preserve and conserve." ll' Thus, often the increased use of land would
not be a benefit."'
Creation of Division and Animosity Between Neighbors
Many adverse possession and prescriptive easements arise nearby or
between adjoining estates." 3 Proximity between an adverse neighbor and
a servient landowner would commonly prove to be a source of personal
hard feelings and division. Some courts recognize this disadvantage and
have held in favor of neighborliness." 4 Other courts refuse to recognize
this doctrine and allow neighbors who use another's land to gain a prescription.

1'

Damages and Loss of Ownership of Private Property
Adverse possession allows someone to take another's land without

payment that seems strangely out of place in America's free market
economy. A good work ethic forms the American foundation and a person gaining title via adverse possession or the use of another's land
without paying for it" 6 rewards the wrongdoer and is contrary to the
American way of life. I 7 Adverse possession "[i]s nothing more than a
person taking someone else's private property for his own private

Sprankling, supra note 1, at 816-18.
111. Id. ch. 1.
112. See infra notes 130, 131 and 132 and accompanying text. It should be noted that some
courts have found the use of unenclosed or open land not to be adverse use. See Fiest v. Steere, 259
P.2d 140 (1953); See also Parker v. McGinnes, 842 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (cattle grazing
on unenclosed land insufficient to meet the "actual, open and notorious" requirement for adverse
possession); But see Carpenter Union Hills Cemetery v. Camp Zoe, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
113. The most common form of prescriptive easement is the right-of-way. BRUCE & ELY, supra
note 20, 1 5.02(3). The nature of most right-of-ways secured through prescription-being appurtenant
to the land-requires that the easement be attached to land. Thus, most prescriptive easements are attached to lands adjacent to the servient estate.
114. See Tacke v. Wynia, 853 P.2d 87 (Mont. 1993).
115. See generally Gustin, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
116. See Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773, 676
P.2d 584 (1984).
117. Taking someone's land without paying for it could be considered stealing. "[Adverse
possession] has been called a means of obtaining title by theft." Netter, supra note 2, at 217. Taking
or "coveting" your neighbor's land goes against the Judeo-Christian ethic (Exodus 20:17.) on which
America was founded. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1947) (America was founded as a
Judeo-Christian nation). However, one could argue that the adverse user "earned" the right to the
easement or property through his own labor.
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use.""11 It is hard to imagine a notion more in contravention of the ideals
set forth in the U.S. Constitution protecting life, liberty and property."9
Creation of Uncertainty for the Landowner
The nature of prescriptive easements and adverse possession creates
an atmosphere of uncertainty for landowners. Both laws project a right of
another onto the servient estate that may exist invisibly for years before it
congeals. 20 Common law requires a landowner to be diligent.' While
diligence could be a benefit in some circumstances, it may turn out that a
landowner may never be attentive enough to suppress all adverse
claims.' 22 To ward off possible adverse claims, a landowner may have to
employ a property expert-which is another expense borne by the servient
estate holder. The easiest remedy for a landowner finding the presence of
an adverse user or possessor is to give them permission to continue the
use or possession. This effectively eliminates the adverse individual's
claim immediately. t'
However, in the end, even with the help of a specialist, the intent
of another may escape the review of experienced eyes." 2 This forms
the basis of an uncertainty that can never be cured while adverse use
reigns in the land.

118. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §2 (1972) (citing Lang v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 266 F. Supp
552 (E.D. Pa. 1967)). Surface rights taken by adverse possession are not the only loss to the original
owner. See Hurst v. Southwest Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 610 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1992) (adverse possession of surface rights carries with it adverse possession of unsevered mineral rights).
119. The Fourteenth Amendment says that a State shall not "deprive any person of life liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Adverse possession and prescription claims are not a part of the public record during the
prescriptive period. See infra notes 137, 138 and 191.
121. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 5.04 (citing Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 715 P.2d 1007,
1010 (Id. Ct. App. 1986)).
122. The various methods by which an adverse possession or prescriptive easement may come
about are overwhelming. See MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club, 72 Cal. App.
693, 140 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. 1977) (the court found a prescriptive easement by a country club from
the use of members of the servient estate's lawn - the members hit stray balls onto the servient estate
for the prescriptive period and gained an easement to do so in the future without the servient owner's
consent) Note-would the court have held differently if the servient owner kept the golf balls? See
also Kroulik v. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (the court found a prescriptive easement to fish from the servient estate - the prescription was from the continued use of a sand bar on
the estate by a fisherman).
123. The "adverse" or "hostile" element is required to perfect a claim of adverse possession or
prescriptive easement in all 50 states. See infra Appendix 1 and 2.
124. Due to the vast array of easements that may be created through prescription, it makes it
virtually impossible for a land owner to completely prevent all adverse uses. See supra note 52.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

ANALYSIS OF THE ABOLITION OF PRESCRIPTION & ADVERSE POSSESSION

Private-propertyrights are the soil in which our concept of human
rights grows and matures.'j
This comment recommends the abolition of prescription and adverse
possession. Prior courts have limited the common law doctrines in certain

circumstances as have many legislatures.26 With the exception of limiting
the common law or expressing disfavor to the adverse laws, 27 no legal
proposal or law28 is known to have suggested the complete abolition of the
common laws.
In the past, legislative bodies have resorted to codification to
simplify a convoluted law existing in common law. 29 This, in concert
with policy arguments of conservation, certainty, landholder rights and
norms in modern society, support abolition of adverse possession and
prescription.

A policy of maximum or increased use of the land supporting adverse possession and prescription, 3 ' is in direct opposition to conservation. 3' Incentives to render an increased use of land are no longer needed
If the needs of society
to open frontiers and provide for society.'

125. Charles E. Wittaker, A Former Justice Warns: Return to Law or Face Anarchy, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 25, 1966, at 60.
126. See Appendix 1. For instance, Arizona and Texas statutes limit adverse possession claims
to 160 acres in many instances. See Appendix 2. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 105.620 (1989) (the
Oregon legislature severely limited the adverse possession doctrine by requiring a belief in ownership
element); See generally Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse Possession In Oregon: The Belief-In-Ownership Requirement, 23 ENVLT. L. 1297 (1993).
127. See Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Chapple-Hawkes, Inc., 643 P.2d 468, 471 (Wyo. 1982)
(prescriptive easements are not favored in law).
128. Extensive review of law review articles, treatises, cases, statutes and legislative documents,
failed to locate one paper endorsing the abolition of adverse possession and prescription.
129. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 71.
131. A recent trend in property law has been use of the conservation easement where a land
owner agrees to leave land relatively undeveloped in exchange for consideration of some kind. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-201-211 (1995); see also City of Olympia v. Plazer, 728 P.2d 135
(Wash. 1986). The basis of the conservation easement is contrary to the nature of prescriptive easements' inherent promotion of increased land use.
132. "The marginal benefit of development of land from an economic standpoint has probably diminished considerably since the frontier days of America. For example, envision a 100 acre parcel. The marginal benefit of developing the first acre is very high, but the marginal benefit of developing each subsequent
acre is diminishing. When the land has been highly developed, as in most industrialized countries today, the
marginal benefit of developing an additional acre is probably less than the marginal benefit of leaving that
acre undeveloped." Telephone interview with Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics at the University
of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut (Oct. 11, 1995). See generally, Sprankling, supra note 1.
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change, the common law should follow-something that has not occurred
in the present circumstance.
Some commentators have argued that adverse possession and prescriptive easements add to the certainty of title in land by "stabilizing
long continued property use." 33 To the contrary, the scope of adverse
possession and prescriptive easements is ever increasing, 3 4 making the
presence of prescriptive easements and adverse possession another hurdle
for landowners.' 35
Certainty or stabilization is offered as one of the benefits or func36
tional uses of prescriptive easements and adverse possession offered. 1
This assumption does not perform well when weighed against the functionality of other stabilizing instruments and laws used in real property
law. The recording statutes offer a more proficient tool in stabilizing land
titles and uses. The recording laws provide a centralized location for title
searches to quickly obtain the rightful owner of land.' 37 Adverse possession and prescription erode the effectiveness and useful utility of both
recording and marketable title statutes by creating uncertainty."'
The rights of landowners provide a strong argument against the use
of adverse possession or prescriptive easements. Other remedies more
conducive to societal values are available should the need for an easement
arise, including easements by necessity.'39 The rights of a landowner
should not be subject to the uses of another without his consent-without

133. POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.10.
134. See supra notes 45, 52, 122 and infra note 163.
135. One commentator has referred to prescriptive easements as the most difficult easement to
define in regards to the extent of the easement when created. See POWELL, supra note 11, § 34.13.
"In order to facilitate the transfer of resources from less to more valuable uses, property rights, in
principle, should be freely transferable." The presence of adverse possession acts as a burden to the
transferability of property. See POSNER, supra note 30, § 3.10.
136. See supra note 133.
137. Unfortunately, the efficiency of the recording statutes, generally, have been eroded by
undetectable claims (e.g. prescription) and a property law overwrought with complexities too numerous to mention. "A rural Georgia lawyer who began his practice during the depression once [said],
'Son, I never began searching a title unless I was starving to death, and I never finished one without
wishing I had.'" See generally Bostick, supra note 105, at 61-62 (quoting his father).
138. Although a recording system would seem a cure-all, adverse possession illustrates one
example of a practice which degrades the system. See Posner, supra note 30, § 3 10 ("The recording
system is not a panacea [in part, due to] the doctrine of adverse possession.").
139. An easement by necessity is one in which the easement is indispensable to the enjoyment
of the dominant estate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1990); See also Establishment of
Private Roads, WYo. STAT. § 24-9-101 (1977). The Wyoming statute provides for landlocked landowners to gain a right-of-way across private land. The receiving landowner is required to pay fair
compensation to the other landowner, as determined by the assessors. Id.
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his permission.'" Adverse uses take away the rights of a landowner 4 ' that
is inequitable when not coupled with compensation. 42
Sometimes proponents argue that adverse uses create a right in the
dominant estate that was never in existence in the servient estate, thus expanding the amount of recognized rights. 43 However, the fiction in this
argument is illustrated in the example of a servient estate owner losing prescriptive easements to one person as opposed to one hundred persons.'" The
latter situation is far more intrusive to the owner and his power to exclude
greatly diminishes with the increased number of easements. 45
Modem society strives for a peaceful and livable world.'" Adverse
concepts cause friction between people. 47 In order for a modem society to
function, it needs to manage the relationship between landowners. 148
Recently, some cases have used adverse possession and prescriptive
easement as a vehicle for the public to gain rights or access in land for public
benefit.' 49 Many courts have realized that the grant of a prescription to the
public is a difficult idea. The public is too broad a group to receive a

140. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 99, 117, 118 and accompanying text.
142. Many courts hold adverse possession and prescription are "not favored in the law." 3 Am.
Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 1, at 93 (rev. 1986). Additionally, the burden of proof for adverse possession or prescription is laid on the adverse user or possessor. 2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 267,
at 25 (rev. 1972). See Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 CONN. B.J. 303,
305 (1992) (every presumption runs in favor of the holder of legal title and none against him). This
leads to the conclusion that equity does not favor adverse possession or prescription.
143. This theory is explained as the successful claim only recognizes a limitation on the servient
estate but expands the right of the dominant estate. See supra note 97.
144. The same prescriptive easement may be claimed by different people as long as the individuals distinguish their use from the use of others. See Palisades Sales Corp. v. Walsh, 459 A.2d 933
(R.I. 1983).
145. One may note that in regard to public easements the number of individuals is so large as to
maintain a full abrogation of rights in the servient estate owner. The servient estate owner can not
possibly resist the publics' use of part of his land and still retain a right in the land used by the
public. See Concerned Citizens of Brunswick Co. Taxpayers Ass'n v. State, 404 S.E.2d 677 (N.C.
1991).
146. Id. See also Shumway v. Sanford, 637 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 1981) (finding no prescriptive
easement because "prescriptive rights and easements are not favored in the law and neighborliness and
accommodations to the needs of a neighbor are landmarks of our western lifestyle.").
147. Instances where a landowner threatens an adverse user to terminate the prescription are not
needed in a peaceful society. See Lorang v. Hunt, 693 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Id. 1984) (relating that
"there is a public interest in encouraging friendly relations among neighbors"); see also Thomas v.
Barnum, 684 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Mont. 1984); Smith v. Bixby, 242 N.W.2d 115 (Neb. 1976).
148. The doctrine of neighborliness is a step in the right direction. See supra note 114. If landowners are peaceful and allow others to use their land, adverse possession and prescription should not
allow the user or possessor to take advantage of such neighborliness and gain rights over the landowner. See supra notes 114 and 115.
149. See Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264 (Wyo. 1987).
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grant.' When granted, who exactly receives the right? Some courts have
held that municipalities may hold prescriptive rights.' Other courts have
awarded prescriptive easements to the public, 5 2 which appears to be the
modem legal trend.' Many states that endorse access rights of the public
54
over private lands have enacted statutes to deal with public prescription.
The use of land by the public was not part of the underlying basis for
the old common law. 55 Such acts should provide a landowner with a "takings" claim under the 5th Amendment-not give a claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement to the public.'56 A public adverse use transfers
a benefit or right from a private individual to the public as a whole-not just
certain portions of the public."5 7 This transfer should provide the basis for an
action in condemnation or a claim of takings.' Using adverse mechanisms
to benefit the public illustrates an example of an outdated idea becoming
more convoluted the longer it lives.19
150. See infra note 159.
151. See Daley v. Town of Swampscott, 421 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Mass. 1981).
152. See DillinghamCommercial Co., supra note 29 at 416.
153. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 5.09.
154. WYO. STAT. § 24-1-101 (1977) (prescriptive use of a roadway allows the state to secure a
right in the roadway); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 812 (West 1980) (statute treats public and private prescription in the same manner); IDAHO CODE § 40-202 (Supp. 1987) (public use of road is
deemed to create a highway).
155. The basis for prescriptive easements is the lost grant and adverse use. See supra notes 23,
24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 and accompanying text. The public is too broad a group to apply these rationales. A landowner may face a difficult task in trying to stop the public at large from entering or
using his land as opposed to an individual. See Mihalczo v. Borough of Woodmont, 400 A.2d 270,
272 (Conn. 1978) (noting the public was unorganized and any grant resulting from prescription was
void for uncertainty); see also State ex rel. Hamman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1098 (Idaho 1979).
156. Under the Constitution the prescription would be a physical intrusion. Unlike regulatory
takings which would require the total economic loss of the property, any physical intrusion by the
government leads to a takings. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
436 (1982) (concluding that the permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interest which it may serve-the court added that "an owner suffers a
special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property"). A takings claim is tolled by the statute of limitations, but a private individual may recover from the government for any physical intrusion still within the term of the statute of limitations. See Reppel v. U.S.,
41 F.3d 627, 632-33 (Fed. Cir. 1994). One may argue the statute of limitations is in order because it
tolls a taking; but a takings claim arises when the land owner's right is taken (i.e. the court's grant
of an easement to the servient owner) not at the beginning of the intrusion (i.e. the beginning of the
adverse use). See U.S. v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748-49, 67 S. Ct. 1382 (1947).
One commentator has suggested that all prescriptive easements, whether gained by a private
individual or the public, is a takings. The court's grant of the easement would serve as the requisite
state action to satisfy the takings claim. Countryman & Perkins, supra note 49, at 168.
157. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, at 5.09(1) (citing Burks Bros. of Va., Inc., v. Jones,
349 S.E.2d 134, 141 (Va. 1986)) (distinguishing general public from landowners, residents, and
guests use).
158. Id.
159. See generally Carl C. Risch, Comment, Encouraging the Responsible use of Land by Municipalities:The Erosion of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the use of Adverse Possession Against
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To the contrary, other cases held that use by the public did not lead to
adverse possession or prescriptive easements. 6° The courts held that land
used by the public lacked the "exclusive" 6 ' element necessary for a claim
under the common law." 6 A prescription by the public makes no sense as no
identifiable group holds the easement
grant and such an action seems to more
63
resemble an act of the sovereign. 1
With this result some courts still argue the private landowner may not
recover compensation from the public or sovereign due to an "adverse taking."" In Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 65 the court held that the statute of
limitations runs on a prescriptive use by a local government on a private
estate." s Further, the Petersen court held that the owner of the land may not
claim a constitutional right against the government after the adverse use
reaches prescription.' 67 This leads to a constitutional right of inverse condemnation being quashed by common law. 6 The denial of a constitutional right
by the workings of a rule based in common law is in direct violation of
rudimentary public policy.' 69

The Remedy: Abolition
The suggestion made in this comment endorses the abolition of prescription and adverse possession. Although this could be achieved through the
MunicipalLand Owners, 99 DICK. L. REv. 197 (1994) (government lands were traditionally beyond
the reach of adverse possession but now the concept has broadened and some municipal land owners
are subject to the doctrine).
160. See Gore v. Blanchard, 118 A. 888 (Vt. 1922); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d
1093 (Id. 1979); ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 200 N.E.2d 282 (Mass. 1964); Smith v. Kraintz, 201
Cal. App. 696, 20 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1962).
161. The exclusive element does not mean "to the exclusion of others," but simply the use must
be independent and not contingent upon other's rights. See Ritter v. Janson, 224 N.E.2d 277, 280
(1967); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Vulles, 437 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1971); but see
Applegate v. Ota, 146 Cal. App. 3d 702, 710, 194 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (1983) (contra where the
court held exclusiveness is not an essential element of prescription).
162. See Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 76 A.2d 808, 811-12 (N.J. 1950).
163. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, at 1 5.09(1) (citing Mihalczo v. Borough of Woodmont,
400 A.2d 270 (Conn. 1978)). The grant to the public through prescription of a road leads to the road
being maintained by the state. Miller v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 440 A.2d 302, 305 (Conn. 1982);
Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 24 N.E. 692, 693 (N.Y. 1890), (the state must accept the prescription and the maintenance of the road.).
164. See Weidner v. State of Alaska, Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, 860 P.2d 1205,
1212 (Alaska 1993) (prescription by the state is not a takings after the prescription term had been
satisfied).
165. 618 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Wash. 1980). See also Beach v. City of Fairbury, 301 N.W.2d 584,
586 (Neb. 1981).
166. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70-1 (Wash. 1980).
167. Id.
168. See supra note 160.
169. Id.
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courts, statutory action in state legislatures is more conducive to this initiative. 70 Legislatures are more adept at dealing with public policy changes and
courts are less able to deal with such issues. 7' While courts make policy
changes, such changes should be made by elected officials.

2

To effect the endorsed change, a statute abolishing the common law and
the statutory definitions of prescription and adverse possession should be
created. The statute should include a grandfather clause to observe the adverse rights already matured by the effective date of the statute. The grandfather clause would have a period of two years in which adverse claimants may
claim any existing right not on record. In addition, the statute should extinguish all future adverse claims by notifying "in progress" adverse users with
statutory notice. An example statute follows:
§ 10-1-100.

ABOLITION OF

ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTION

(a) On and after January 1, 1997, all common law and statutory
rights of adverse possession and prescription are hereby and
forever abolished. This includes, but is not limited to the repeal
of STATE STAT. §§ 20-1-100 through 20-2-110 (19XX). This
repealing action will in no way invalidate any statutes that are
peripheral to the adverse possession or prescription statutes.
(b) This statute does not create any new rights of action in any
person or group.
(c) Any person or group that has satisfied the requirements to a
claim of adverse possession or prescription has a recognized
right. This statute, coupled with the notice provision provided
herein, will serve as notice to all such persons or groups that
they have two (2) years and one (1) month from the date set
forth in section (a) of this statute to perfect their interest and
claim their right of easement or fee simple under prescription
or adverse possession. Notice by the county clerk will be posted in one local or area newspaper, once a week for three consecutive weeks within one (1) month of the implementation of
said statute. Procedures for perfecting such a right is set forth
in section (d) of this statute. If such persons or groups fail to
perfect their right by February 1, 1999, they will forever lose
170. See supra note 12.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 469 (1886) ("This court can know nothing
of public policy except from the Constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine
questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort must, in
general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are concluded here.").
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their ability to bring any type of claim based on adverse possession or prescription.
(d) In order for a person or group to perfect an adverse interest
that has satisfied either the common law or statutory requirements of adverse possession or prescription by the date set
forth in section (a) of this statute, said person or group must
file claim to such property in the appropriate county court(s).
The location of the adversely possessed or used property will
determine the appropriate county court(s) where the claim
should be filed.
Opposition to Abolition of Adverse Possession and Prescription
A question that appears with the abolition of prescription and adverse
possession relates to "in progress" adverse uses. The common law has always required a requisite term of use or possession to find an easement
through prescription or land transfer through adverse possession.' 73 Statute
defines the period in most states, 74 and completion of the period finds recognition of the right. 7 Therefore, before satisfaction of the adverse term, no
right has accrued to the adverse possessor or person seeking prescription.
Some inequity may result from such a holding, but the adverse possessor and
person seeking prescription would have notice upon passage of any repealing
statute.' 76 Thus, the state would replace a landowner and deny the claims

before the right accrues."7 If an adverse possessor or prescription seeker has
no definable right, no problems should arise from an abolishing statute.
However, an existing claim may need separate treatment. If an adverse
claim has already reached the specified term, a right has accrued. 7 8 The

173.

SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 105-15. See Appendix 2.

174. Some states have statutes where the term is defined for adverse possession and/or prescription. Other states use the statutes of limitations to define the term of adverse use or possession. See
Appendix 2.
175. The owner may terminate the prescriptive use or adverse possession through permission.
court action or action. Silverstein v. Byers, 845 P.2d 893, 842 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (permission

cannot ripen); Margoline v. Holefelder, 218 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1966) (interruption by obstruction);
Workman v. Curram, 89 Pa. 226 (1879) (court action lawsuit); Miller v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 440
A.2d 302 (Conn. 1982).
176. Some states have enacted statutes giving the landowner the ability to notify the adverse
user or possessor through a written notice, thereby terminating the prescriptive claim. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-41 (West 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-7-7 (1984). These statutes would be
similar in action to the state notifying the adverse users through statute.
177. See supra note 180.

178. Permission given by the landowner after the term has run is not considered to terminate the
adverse use or possession claim. This leads to the conclusion that the right of the adverse user has accrued, and the adverse user may still claim the easement or land. See Community Feed Store, Inc. v.
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party seeking possession or prescription may already have a legally supportable claim in court. The statute would put the adverse possessor of prescriptive user on notice and require some action within a specified period.' 79
Thus, because some right exists in the adverse possessor or person
seeking prescription," s° the statute abolishing adverse possession and prescriptive easements will need a grandfather clause. It should allow a period of
protection to the existing rights of unperfected adverse interests. Such a
clause would not pertain to "in progress" rights. It would only apply to those
rights that have run the specified term before enactment of the abolishing
statute.
The clause would allow the adverse possessor or person seeking prescription a term to perfect the adverse interest. A simple recording of the
right under the statute would suffice. The term should be short in relation to
the old term for prescription or adverse possession, such as two or three
years. "' Failure to abide by the statutes' terms for perfecting an adverse
right will affect the loss of the right forever. The term would serve equity by
creating an opening for existing rights and wiping the slate of any unidentified adverse uses.
Admittedly, a real need exists for adverse possession in cases of boundary disputes." This narrow area of the common law may require some
replacement action in a statute that acts to abolish prescription and adverse
possession. However, the simple, clear approach of complete elimination of
adverse possession is preferred."t Then, in boundary disputes, the courts can
assess damages for lost rents, etc., instead of issuing injunctions. This al-

Northeastern Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1068 (Vt. 1989); Gault v. Bahm, 826 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); Behen v. Elliott, 791 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Observation of due process for persons with a vested right is of utmost importance. See
supra note 119. For that reason, the suggested statute provides public notice for three consecutive
weeks in local newspapers throughout the subject state. It should be noted that as a state is able to
expand or contract the period of prescription as it sees fit-for the same reason, the state has the right
to eliminate the right if it is supported by public policy. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. A tenet to the abolition of adverse possession and prescription is eliminating the problem
of uncertainty. The term should not continue the uncertainty for the property in question. See supra
notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
182. Boundary disputes are on the rise because of increasing real estate values and the explosive
growth in the secondary mortgage market. Deirdre Fanning, This land is my land. . . or is it? (New
England Boundary Disputes), FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 62. The authors of this comment argue that
adverse possession is only justified when an adverse user truly mistakes his property boundary
line-not when a neighbor or "squatter" intentionally trespasses to secure an adverse right. See Miceli
& Sirmans, supra note 2, at 161-62 ("What this argument overlooks ... is that [a] good faith error
[is] difficult . . . to distinguish from intentional boundary encroachment."). Public policy should not
reward the trespasser simply because he is good at it.
183. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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ready occurs in disputes arising between adverse possessors/prescriptive users
and landowners prior to satisfaction of the statutory period.
Opponents may contend abolition will resurrect the problem of "old" or
"stale" evidence. s' This argument is invalid considering current methods of
record storage on microfiche, computer disks and data tapes.
Instead of broadening the use of the antiquated common law to cover an
increasing array of situations, I" the various states should abolish the common
law. Many states have already acted to limit the doctrines."8 The abolition of
the adverse doctrines will not only serve to clarify titles to land by eliminating adverse claims,"8 but will also simplify property law. 8
Legislatures have resorted to statute several times to remedy the nebulous and convoluted nature of the common law.' 89 It is time for those same

governmental institutions to update the law of adverse concepts as they have
done in other areas of the law.'9
CONCLUSION: A WELCOME UPDATE TO PROPERTY LAW

To update and elucidate land law in America, this comment has endorsed the burial of adverse possession and prescription through legislation.

184. See supra note 31. See also Chaplin v. Sanders, supra note 71; Netter, supra note 2, at
219 ("After a certain period litigation become inefficient .. and there is a depreciation in the availability of the evidence.").
185. See supra note 52.
186. Arizona has passed a statute to limit all adverse possession claims to a maximum of 160
acres per claim. See Appendix 2. The Texas adverse possession statute has a similar limitation to 160
acres. Id. Wyoming's "Public Road Statute" limits any road taken by prescription under the act to a
maximum width of 66 feet. Steplock v. Taylor, 894 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1995).
187. Adverse claims are often not recorded when gained. See POWELL, supra note 11, at §
34.21 ("When an easement has been acquired by prescription, the recording acts cannot function,
since they relate only to priorities among instruments affecting land ownership."). The search of land
titles would be more reliable when claims to land, not in the records, are reduced.
188. A good deal of property law is dedicated to the attempted unraveling of the adverse doctrines discussed in this paper. See generally Thompson, supra note 14. See also infra note 193.
189. People v. Brengard, 191 N.E. 850, 853 (N.Y. 1934) ("The design of the Penal Code and
the Penal Law was to make definitions of crime as nearly certain as possible and, in the execution for
this plan for clarity, the abolition of all common-law crimes."); Miles v. Caldwell, 69 U.S. 35, 43
(1864) (some states uphold many common law rules of land conveyancing which are complicated
while some states have enacted conveyancing statutes which are exceedingly simple and effectual);
Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe R.R. Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 60, 61 (1879) (code was enacted by the
legislature to abolish common law forms of action and simplify the law); Angus v. Fair, 132 Cal.
523, 552, 64 P. 1000, 1005 (1901) (repeal of common law meant simplification of the law); In re
Peck, 136 Misc. 294, 295, 240 N.Y.S. 634, 635 (1930) (purpose of codification reform from the
common law included simplification).
190. See supra note 193.
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These two ideas are "dusty, obscure relics" of the past"' and finish one
bullet short in a showdown with modem public policy." Perhaps in the days
of creaky wooden sidewalks these two doctrines appeared as shiny as the
sheriff's badge: At high noon today the adverse uses look as rusty as an old
pair of spurs.
Acquisition of land or easement by adverse use encourages land development and penalizes conservation. It creates uncertainty in land titles and
produces a chilling effect on the real estate market. Further, adverse use
takes rights or property from the landowner without compensation and cuts
against the grain of neighborliness. Public policy has opened a resting place
on Boot Hill for the adverse uses-hopefully we will have the fortitude to
pick up the shovel and finish the job.
WILLIAM G. ACKERMAN
SHANE T. JOHNSON

191. See supra note 3.
192. See generally Bostick, supra note 105, at n.4. America allows many antiquated doctrines
to exist long after abolition in their country of origin. England abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case
in 1924; the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in 1925; and the Doctrine of Worthier Title in 1833.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

APPENDIX 1
PRESCRIPTION LAWS OF THE FIFTY STATES
Alabama: Apley v. Tagert, 584 So. 2d 816, 817 (Ala. 1991) (citing Hereford
v. Gingo-Morgan Park, 551 So. 2d 918 (Ala. 1989)) (20 years adverse use
continuously and uninterrupted); Alaska: Fairbanks North Star Borough v.
Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 53 (Alaska 1995) (citing ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.10.030) (expiration of 10-year statute of limitations is precondition for
prescriptively acquiring property without color of title); Arizona: Inch v.
McPhereson, 859 P.2d 755, 757 (Ariz. 1992) (quoting Rorebeck v. Criste,
398 P.2d 678, 681 (Ariz. App. 1965)) ("To prove adverse possession for an
easement [it must be shown] by clear and convincing evidence that [the
adverse user's] use was 'actual, open and notorious, hostile, under a claim
of right, continuous for the statutory period [here, 10 years], and exclusive."'); Arkansas: Neyland v. Hunter, 668 S.W.2d 530, 531-32 (Ark.
1984) (7 year period); California: Zimmer v. Dykstra, 39 Cal. App.3d 422,
430 114 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1974) (citing CAL CIV. CODE § 1007) (5 year
period); Colorado: Whinnery v. Thompson, 868 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Colo.
1993) (18 years of continuous, open and adverse possession of a right-of-way
required to establish an easement by prescription); Connecticut: O'Brien v.
Coburn, 664 A.2d 312, 314 (Conn. 1995) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-37; Gioielli v. Mallard Cove Condominium Ass', Inc., 658 A.2d 134
(Conn. App. 1995)) (15 years of open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted
use made under claim of right); Delaware: Berger v. Colonial Parking, Inc.,
1993 WL 208761 (Del. Ch. 1993) (citing Lickle v. Frank W. Diver, Inc.,
238 A.2d 326, 329 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968) ("[E]lements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement are a continuous, uninterrupted and adverse
use ... for a period of 20 years."); District of Columbia: Chaconas v.
Meyers, 465 A.2d 379, 381 (D.C. 1983) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12301(1), 16-3301 (1967); 12-301(1) (1981)) (prescriptive easement requires
open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and adverse use for a statutory period
of 15 years); Florida: FloridaPower Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311, 314
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (citing common law and FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.18) (20 years); Georgia: Henderson v. Cam Dev. Co., 190 Ga.App. 199,
378 S.E.2d 495 (1989) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-9-1, 44-9-59) (7 years
generally, or 20 years for "wild land"); Hawaii: The Nature Conservancy v.
Nakila, 4 Haw.App. 584, n.17, 671 P.2d 1025, n.17 (1983) (citing HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 657-31 (1976)) (20 years uninterrupted and continuous adverse use); Idaho: Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961)
(citing IDAHO CODE § 5-203) (5 years); Illinois: Daniels v. Anderson, 252
Ill.App.3d 289, 307, 624 N.E.2d 1151, 1163 (1993) (adverse, exclusive,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/3

28

Ackerman and Johnson: Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Ad

1996

APPENDIX I

continuous and uninterrupted under a claim of right for 20 years) (citing
Healy v. Roberts, 440 N.E.2d 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)); Indiana: Bauer v.

Harris, 617 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Powell v.
Dawson, 469 N.E.2d 1179, 1181) ("A prescriptive easement is established
by actual, open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use for 20
years under a claim of right, or by continuous adverse use with the knowledge and acquiescence of the servient owner."); Iowa: Heald v. Glentzer,
491 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Simonsen v. Todd, 261
Iowa 485, 489, 154 N.W.2d 730, 732 (1967) (quoting Webb v. Arterburn,
246 Iowa 363, 379, 67 N.W.2d 504, 513 (1954); see also IOWA CODE §
564.1 (1991))) (one way a prescriptive easement may be created is by adverse possession, under claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously,
continuously, and hostilely for 10 years or more); Kansas: Chintz v. Strait,
173 Kan. 625, 630, 250 P.2d 806, 809 (1952) (easement by prescription may
be acquired by exclusive and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the right for
a period of time sufficient to acquire title to soil by adverse possession,
which is 15 years); Kentucky: Jackey v. Burkhead, 341 S.W.2d 64, 65
(1960) (quoting Riley v. Jones, 295 Ky. 389, 174 S.W.2d 530, 531 (date
omitted)) ("To establish title to an easement by prescription, adverse possession must be actual, open, notorious, forcible, exclusive, and hostile, and
must continue in full force ... for at least 15 years."); Louisiana: LA. CIV.
CODE. ANN. art. 742 (West 1980) (prescriptive easement created after 10
years of use in good faith and under just title or after 30 years uninterrupted
possession without just title or good faith); Maine: Davis v. Mitchell, 628
A.2d 657, n.5 (Me. 1993) (quoting Jost v. Resta, 536 A.2d 1113, 1114 (Me.
1988) (quoting Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 230, 98 A. 743 (1916)))
("[To prove the existence of a prescriptive easement, a party must prove
'continuous use for at least 20 years under a claim of right adverse to the
owner, with [the owner's] knowledge and acquiescence, or by use so open,
notorious, visible and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be
presumed."'); Maryland: Forrester v. Kiler, 98 Md.App. 481, 484, 633
A.2d 913, 915 (1993) (citing Shuggars v. Brake, 234 A.2d 752 (Md. 1966))
(a prescriptive easement is established when a party proves that the use was
adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted for a period of 20 years); Massachusetts: Brooks, Gill and Co., Inc. v. Landmark Properties, 217 Ltd. Partnership, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 528, 530, 503 N.E.2d 983, 985 (1987) (20 years);
Michigan: Goodall v. Whitefish Hunting Club, 208 Mich.App. 642, 645, 528
N.W.2d 221, 223 (1995) (citing Marr v Hemenny, 297 Mich. 311, 297
N.W. 504 (1941)) ("[Ain easement by prescription arises from a use...
that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of 15 years.");
Minnesota: Lindquist v. Weber, 404 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.02) (15 years and must also prove that the
use was open, continuous, actual, hostile and exclusive.); Mississippi:
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Rutland v. Stewart, 630 So. 2d 996, 998 (Miss. 1994) (10 years); Missouri:
Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enters., Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Hermann v. Lynnbrook Land Co., 806 S.W.2d 128, 131
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (open, adverse, visible, continuous and uninterrupted
use under claim of right for 10 years required); Montana: Brown v.
Tintinger, 245 Mont. 373, 801 P.2d 607 (1990) (citing MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 70-19-401) (5 years); Nebraska: Kimco Addition, Inc. v. Lower Platte S.
Natural Resources Dist., 232 Neb. 289, 294, 440 N.W.2d 456, 460 (1989)
("A party claiming a prescriptive easement must show that its use was exclusive, adverse, under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted, and open
and notorious for the full 10-year prescriptive period."); Nevada: Michelsen
v. Harvey, 107 Nev. 859, 863, 822 P.2d 660, 663 (1991) (citing Wilfon v.
Hampel 1995 Trust, 105 Nev. 607, 608, 781 P.2d 769, 770 (1989) (citing
Stix v. LaRue, 78 Nev. 9, 11, 368 P.2d 167, 168 (1962))) ("A prescriptive
easement is created through 5 years of adverse, continuous, open and peaceable use of land."); New Hampshire: Vigeant v. Donel Realty Trust, 130
N.H. 406, 408, 540 A.2d 1243 (1988) (quoting Page v. Downs, 115 N.H.
373, 374, 341 A.2d 767, 768 (1975)) ("The [prescriptive] claimant [must
prove] '20 years adverse continuous, uninterrupted use of the land...
claimed in such a manner as to give notice to the record owner that an adverse claim [is] being made to it."); New Jersey: Leach v. Anderl, 218
N.J.Super.App.Div. 18, 28, 526 A.2d 1096, 1101 (1987) (quoting Baker v.
Normanoch Ass'n, Inc., 25 N.J. 407, 419, 136 A.2d 645 (1957)) ("The
nature of the user necessary for the creation of an easement by prescription is
the same as that for the acquisition of title by adverse possession, i.e., it
must be adverse or hostile, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, visible and
notorious for a period of 20 years."); New Mexico: Southern Union Gas Co.
v. Cantrell, 56 N.M. 184, 241 P.2d 1209 (1952) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN §
27-121 (1941)) (10 years); New York: Alexy v. Salvador, 630 N.Y.S.2d 133,
135 (1995) (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 311 (McKinney (1979);
Led Duke v. Sommer, 205 A.D.2d 1009 (1994)) (clear and convincing evidence required to show prescriptive use was adverse, open and notorious,
continuous and uninterrupted for the 10-year prescriptive period); North
Carolina: Pitcock v. Fox, 119 N.C.Ct.App. 307, 309, 458 S.E.2d 264, 266
(1995) (citing Potts v. Burnett, 301 N.C. 663, 666, 273 S.E.2d 285, 287-88
(1981)) (a prescriptive claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the use is adverse, hostile or under claim of right; (2) that the
use has been open and notorious such that the true owner had notice of the
claim; (3) that the use has been continuous and uninterrupted for a period of
at least 20 years; (4) that there is substantial identity of the easement claimed
throughout the 20-year period."); North Dakota: L.A. Gajewski v. Taylor,
536 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1995) (quoting Nagel v. Emmon Co. Water Resource
Dist., 474 N.W.2d 46, 48 (N.D. 1991)) ("A use of land creates a prescriphttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/3

30

Ackerman and Johnson: Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Ad

1996

APPENDIX 1

tive easement if 'the use is (1) adverse, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, and
(3) for the period of prescription [of 20 years]."'); Ohio: Nice v. City of
Marysville, 82 Ohio Ct.App. 109, 113, 611 N.E.2d 468, 470 (1992) (citing
J.F. Gioia, Inc. v. Cardinal Am. Corp., 23 Ohio App.Ct. 33, 491 N.E.2d
235 (1985)) ("The party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that the
property is being used in a manner that is (a) open, (b) notorious, (c) adverse
to the landowner's property rights, (d) continuous, and (e) for at least twenty-one years."); Oklahoma: Brown v. Mayfield, 786 P.2d 708 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1989) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 93 (1981), tit. 60 § 333 (1981))
(15 years); Oregon: Johnson v. Becker, 1995 WL 600331 (Or. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or. 542, 546, 528 P.2d 509 (1974);
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.050) (To establish a prescriptive easement, one must
show, by clear and convincing evidence, open and notorious use of land
adverse to the rights of another for a continuous and uninterrupted period of
10 years.); Pennsylvania:Martin v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 1995 WL 553909, 2
(Pa. 1995) (citing Boyd v. Teeple, 460 Pa. 91, 94, 331 A.2d 433, 434
(1975)) ("A prescriptive easement is created by adverse, open continuous,
notorious, and uninterrupted use of land for twenty-one years."); Rhode
Island: Altieri v. Dolan, 423 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1980) (prescriptive easement requires adverse use (that which is held openly, notoriously and hostilely under
claim of right), and must be continuous and uninterrupted for 10 years);
South Carolina: Horry County v. Laychur, 434 S.E.2d 259, 261 (S.C. 1993)
(citing County of Darlington v. Perkins, 269 S.C. 572, 239 S.E.2d 69
(1977)) ("[To establish a prescriptive easement, the following must be
shown:] (1) There must be continued and uninterrupted use or enjoyment of
the right for a period of 20 years. (2) The identity of the thing enjoyed must
be proven. (3) The use must have been adverse or under a claim of right.");
South Dakota: Travis v. Madden, 493 N.W.2d 717, 720 (S.D. 1992) (citing
Kougl v. Curry, 73 S.D. 427, 432, 44 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1950); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-3-1) ("To claim the benefit of an easement by pre-

scription, a person must show open, continued, and unmolested use of the
land in the possession of another [for 20 years]."); Tennessee: Fugate v.
McConnell, 1995 WL 309991, 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting House v.
Close, 48 Tenn.App. 341, 345 (1961)) ("[To establish a prescriptive easement,] the use and enjoyment which will give title by prescription to an
easement or other incorporeal right must be adverse, under claim of right,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible, exclusive, and with knowledge and
acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, and must continue for
the full [20-year prescriptive period.]"); Texas: Wiegand v. Riojas, 547
S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (10 years); Utah: Green v. Stansfield,
886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1994) (citing Marchant v. Park City, 778 P.2d
520, 524 (Utah 1990)) ("A prescriptive easement may be granted when a use
is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty
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years."); Vermont: Buttolph v. Erikkson, 160 Vt. 618, 648 A.2d 824, 825
(1993) (quoting Community Feed Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp.,
151 Vt. 152, 155, 559 A.2d 1068, 1070 (1989)) (easement by prescription is
established by open, notorious, hostile and continuous possession of property
for a period of 15 years); Virginia: Chaney v. Haynes, 250 Va. 155, 158,
458 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1995) (proof of a prescriptive easement requires the
showing by clear and convincing evidence that use was adverse, under a
claim of right, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, and with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the owners of the land for 20 years); Washington: The
Mountaineers v. Wymer, 56 Wash. 721, 355 P.2d 341 (1960) (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.16.020) (10 years); West Virginia: Moran v. Edman, 460
S.E.2d 477 (W.Va. 1995) (three levels of quotes omitted) ("The open, continuous and uninterrupted use of a road over the land of another, under bona
fide claim of right, and without objection from the owner, for a period of ten
years, creates in the user of such road a right by prescription to the continued
use thereof."); Wisconsin: Draeger v. Gutzdorf, 465 N.W.2d 204, 205 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Mushel v. Town of Molitor, 365 N.W.2d 622, 626
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985)) ("One must show the following elements to establish
an easement by prescription: '(1) adverse use that is hostile and inconsistent
with the exercise of the titleholder's possessive rights; (2) which is visible,
open, and notorious; (3) under an open claim of right; (4) and is continuous
and uninterrupted for twenty years."'); Wyoming: Shumway v. Tom Sanford,
Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 1981) (citing Auchmuty v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 349 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1960; See also Gregory
v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795 (Wyo. 1981) (citing WYO. STAT. § 1-3-103
(1977)) (a prescriptive easement arises from hostile and adverse use which is
open, visible, continuous and unmolested for 10 years).
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APPENDIX 2
ADVERSE POSSESSION STATUTES OF THE FIFTY STATES

Alabama: ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (1975) (10 years on record with adverse
possessor coupled with payment of taxes by adverse party); Alaska: ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.10.030, 09.45.052 (1994) (10 years adverse possession required
for all adverse possession claims except those against the state or United
States, which only requires 7 years adverse possession); Arizona: ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-523, 12-525, 12-526 (1992) (3 years adverse possession
under color of title, 5 years under duly recorded deed, 10 years adverse use
and enjoyment with a limitation to 160 acres); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. §
18-5-61 (Michie 1987) (5 years adverse possession bars ejectment by land
owner); California: CAL CIV. PROC. CODE tit. 2, § 325 (West 1982) (generally requires 5 years adverse possession); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-41-101 (West 1990) (18 years adverse possession is conclusive
evidence of absolute ownership, but not allowed against governmental entities); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-575 (West 1991) (statute
of limitations of 15 years on the right of entry to land owner as against an
adverse possessor). Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7901 (1974)
(twenty years); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1113, 12-301
(1981) (15 years required for adverse possession and prescription); Florida:
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 95.12, 95.16, 95.18; (West 1982 & West Interim
Update 1995) (7 years required whether under color of title or not); Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-161, 44-5-163, 44-5-164 (Michie 1995) (20 years
required except where claim is made under written evidence of title, whereby
a period of 7 years is required); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-31 (1988)
(20 years); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 5-210 (1990) (5 years required to ripen an
adverse possession claim if the adverse possessor has paid the property taxes); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/13-105, 5/13-107, 5/13-109
(Smith-Hurd 1995) (20 years required unless the adverse action is taken
under claim of title or the adverse user has paid the property taxes, whereby
the time is reduced to 7 years); Indiana: IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-1-2-2
(Michie 1986) (10 year statute of limitations); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§
614.17, 614.17A (West Cumm. Supp. 1995) (10 years); Kansas: KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-503 (1994) (15 years); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
413.010 (Baldwin 1995) (15 years); Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3473, 3486, 3490, 3491 (West 1994) (30 years or 10 years under good faith
and title); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 801 (West 1980) (20
years); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTs, & JUD. PROC. § 5-103 (1995) (20
years); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 21 (West 1992)
(20 years); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-5801 (West 1987)
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(15 years); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.02 (West 1988) (15 years);
Mississippi: MISS. CODE. ANN. § 15-1-13 (1993) (10 years); Missouri: Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 516.010 (Vernon 1995) (10 years); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-19-411 (1995) (5 year if taxes were paid by the adverse user);
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (1989) (10 years); Nevada: NEV. REv.
STAT. § 40.090 (1993) (15 years with 5 years of taxes paid required prior to
filing of a claim); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:2 (1994)
(20 years); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West 1995) (30 years,
60 years for woodlands or uncultivated tracts); New Mexico: N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-22 (Michie 1995) (10 years with a writing purporting to give
color of title and the payment of taxes for a period by the adverse possessor);
New York: N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 501, 511, 512 (McKinney 1979)
(10 years); North Carolina:N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38, 1-40 (1994) (20 years
or 7 years under claim of title); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE. § 47-0603 (1995) (10 years with the payment of taxes); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. § 2305.04 (Baldwin 1995) (21 years); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 93 (West 1994) (15 years); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. § 105.620
(1993) (10 years); Pennsylvania: 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 81 (1994) (21
years); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-7-1 (1984) (10 years); South
Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (10 years);
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-3-1, 15-3-15 (1984) (20
years unless taxes paid and claim made under color of title, whereby the
period is reduced to 10 years); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-101,
28-2-103 (1980) (7 years under color of title); Texas: TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.026, 16.027, 16.028 (West 1986)
(25 years unless held under title and/or taxes, whereby the period is reduced
to 10, 5, or possibly 3 years and a limitation of 160 acres); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-7, 78-12-7.1 (1953) (7 years with a legal title); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. § 12-501 (1973) (15 years); Wrginia: VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-236 (Michie 1950) (15 years); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.16.020 (West Cumm. Supp. 1995), 7.28.050 (West 1992) (10
years unless adverse possessor has a title of record, whereby the period is
reduced to 7 years); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE. § 55-2-1 (1994) (10
years); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.25 (West 1983) (20 years); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. § 1-3-103 (1988) (10 years).
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